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As a nation with the largest prison population in the world, the United States has 
all the ingredients for criminals, extremists, and religious radicals to collaborate in 
producing a new breed of homegrown terrorist. Although there are documented cases 
where homegrown prison converts have conducted or provided material support for 
terrorist operations both domestically and internationally, the phenomenon is still a 
relatively new concern for U.S. homeland security. This thesis uses survey and interview 
methodologies to assess the opinions of correctional officers and experts as to the extent 
of the problem, as well as identifying gaps in intelligence, training, and strategy. The 
results suggest that prisons are fertile recruiting grounds for disaffected inmates that may 
be influenced by charismatic extremists acting under the guise of religion or politics. 
However, the results also point to a disconnect between corrections and other homeland 
security disciplines that prevents the creation of a robust information sharing 
environment. This study’s conclusions indicate that a comprehensive and effective 
strategy cannot be developed without first acknowledging that the problem exists, 
understanding the rudimentary contributing factors, and initiating discussion on a multi-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The importance of ideological extremist activities in America’s prisons as a 
potential recruiting pool for foreign and domestic terrorist groups is a developing concern 
for homeland security officials. The physical and psychological vulnerability of being 
imprisoned in an atmosphere that deprives inmates of all but the most basic of privileges 
provides the opportunity for extremists to establish bonds with individuals through social 
networks and constitutionally protected activities. These activities “foster identity 
construction (or reconstruction) and encourage social bonds that facilitate joining by 
creating a new social network and solidarity to encourage individuals to stay the course 
and continue”1 upon parole or release back into society. It is this situation that places 
inmates in an environment to be recruited by ideological extremists and converted to 
radicalization.  
While the Office of the Inspector general (OIG) provided an April 2004 review of 
the policies and procedures for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as they relate to 
Muslim religious service providers, deficiencies still exist in restricting messages of hate 
and anti-government propaganda to inmates as part of religious activities.2 The problem 
goes beyond spreading hate-filled material that may cause a problem internally for prison 
officials. Political expressions of free speech by incarcerated members of right-wing and 
left-wing anti-government groups may also contribute to the development of extremist 
views that carry over to terrorist activities outside of prison walls. Training for prison 
staff needs to be implemented to recognize legitimate religious or free speech activities 
from the extremist threat and interrupt the cycle of radicalization before it results in 
 
1 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam, Paper presented at Yale 
University’s The Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference (New Haven, May 10, 2004), 10 at 
http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-paper.pdf 
(Accessed August 16, 2006). 
2 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 




                                                
another terrorist attack against the United States. Identifying the sources of the problem, 
tracking the conversion rates and activities of inmates inside and outside of prison, and 
delivering credible intelligence products to homeland security practitioners presents a 
significant challenge for a country that has the largest prison population in the world. 
B. PROBLEM HISTORY 
The problem of prison radicalization is not new, nor is the problem limited to the 
United States. Richard Reid was introduced to radical Islam while incarcerated in 
London’s Feltham Young Offender’s Institution for crimes committed as a gang member 
when he began the conversion that would lead him to attempt to blow up an American 
Airlines flight bound for Miami. Upon his release from prison, Reid’s radicalization was 
nourished by sermons from well-known radical clerics such as Abu Hamza al-Masri at 
the same Finnsbury Park mosque attended by convicted 9/11 terrorist Zacarias 
Moussaoui.3  
The leader of the failed London subway and bus bombings in July 2005 converted 
to Islam while incarcerated at the same institution as Richard Reid. Muktar Said Ibrahim 
was seventeen years old and already serving a five-year sentence for multiple knife 
assaults as a member of a street gang. His conversion to Islam led him to the same 
Finnsbury Park radical mosques as Reid and Moussaoui where he developed his religious 
radicalization.4 He is awaiting trial on conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to 
cause explosions likely to endanger life or cause serious injury. 
Although they were introduced to radical Islam in prison, there is no verifiable 
evidence that Reid or Ibrahim progressed beyond conversion in the radicalization process 
until they were released and sought out extremist ideology on their own. At the very least 
though, prison provided an introduction to radical Islam and set into motion the ideology 
that would have a significant impact upon their lives. An example of direct connections 
between extremists in prison and radicalization can be found in the case of Levar Haley 
Washington who joined the radical Islamic prison group Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Sheeh 
 
3 Michael Elliot, “The Shoe Bomber’s World,” Time, February 25, 2002, 47-50. 




                                                
(JIS) while in the California State Prison in Sacramento. Washington conspired with 
other JIS members to conduct terrorist acts upon his release from prison in November 
2004.5 While in prison, Washington was influenced by JIS founder and radical Muslim 
Kevin Lamar James and participated in a coordinated effort to fund terrorist activity by 
committing armed robberies.6 Jamal Ahmidan is another example of an inmate who 
embarked on a path to radicalization in a Spanish prison that would eventually lead to his 
participation in the 2004 Madrid train bombings. These cases are only a few of the most 
recent examples where prisons played a critical part in creating terrorists who would 
eventually become actively involved in an attack. 
These cases also draw attention to the developing associations between criminal 
gangs and extremist groups in prisons. Although training is available to line personnel 
who seek to educate themselves on gang activity and extremist groups, this is an area that 
deserves more attention to bring an understanding of the threat to a higher level. Prison 
officials have recognized the value of collecting information on prison gang activity and 
the creation of Security Threat Intelligence Units to track these threats have produced 
good intelligence products for law enforcement investigations, reduced violence and 
saved lives. A portion of the hypothesis set forth in this thesis is that similar efforts 
applied to radicalizing extremists in prison would bring similar desirable effects.  
Iranian proselytizing of inmates in U.S. prisons, to include the recruitment, 
indoctrination and instruction of radical Islam, has been occurring since the late 1970s.7 
The threat of radical Islamist infiltration in the American prison system presents a 
significant challenge for corrections and law enforcement. In many ways, this concern 
reflects the overall anxiety of the international terrorist communities’ capacity to enlist 
support amongst the disenfranchised members of society to champion their political 
agendas. The pool of potential recruits far outweighs the available intelligence and 
 
5 United States Department of Justice, “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to 
Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities, Other Targets,” press release (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Justice, 2005) at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05_crm_453.htm (Accessed August 9, 2006). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Gregory R. Copley, “Handling radical, terrorist and politicized prisoners,” Defense & Foreign 
Affairs Strategic Policy 30, no.1 (January 2002): 9. 
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security resources to effectively deal with the growing problem. Therefore, it is 
imperative that we understand the threat before developing the strategy that will 
determine our course of action. 
1. Divergent Sects 
All of the September 11, 2001 terrorists practiced a form of Sunni Islam known as 
Wahhabism or Salifism. While both movements are puritanical,l there are differences that 
should be pointed out to illustrate how some sects can be more radical than others and 
subsequently offer a stronger appeal to potential recruits. Wahhibists are followers of an 
eighteenth-century reformist who sought to restore the fundamentalist practices of Islam 
to the Qur’an and reunite Muslims in what is now known as Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism 
became the officially recognized sect of Islam in Saudi Arabia and is the predominant 
influence in most national Islamic organizations in the United States. Although 
Wahhibists are generally iconoclastic and intolerant of influences outside the original 
teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith, followers will recognize the subsequent religious 
commentaries and injunctions issued by respected modern Islamic scholars.8 Prior to 
2003, the Wahhabi-based Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was the key 
organization that endorsed and trained Muslim chaplains for the BOP and the U.S. 
military.9 Salifists recognize only the Qur’an and Hadith as the ultimate religious 
authority and oppose the initiation of modern interpretations by religious experts “on the 
grounds that it arrogates to humans a right to legislate which is reserved (only) to God.”10 
Both the Taliban and al Qaeda emerged from this movement that seeks to divide the 
world between fundamental Islamic ideology and modern western influence. Simply 
because a Muslim adheres to a Wahhabi or Salifi orientation does not mean he is 
predisposed to radicalism or will engage in terrorist activity.11 However, Salifism is one 
sect associated with radical Islamic fundamentalists where there is evidence on the part of 
 
8 Nadav Morag, Faculty, Naval Postgraduate School, Electronic communication with the author, 
September 14, 2006. 
9 U.S. DOJ, OIG, 18.  
10 Amhad Dallal, “Appropriating the Past: Twentieth-Century Reconstruction of Pre-Modern Islamic 
Thought,” Islamic Law and Society 7, no.3. (2000): 325. 
11 U.S. DOJ, OIG, 4. 
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some extremists of their exploitation of religious beliefs to further terrorist activity in this 
form of Islam. For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, and Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi can be considered neo-Salifists who have used the legitimate practice of Islamic 
scholarship to justify the killing of civilians, including other Muslims of their own sect, to 
perpetuate their violent political agendas and terrorist organization. 
Martyrs for Morocco is a terrorist group that has its origin in Spain’s prison 
system and is connected to the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The prison 
population provided the support base for acquiring the explosives and the network to plan 
and execute the attacks.12 These radical Islamists are the prototype for prison integration 
in the United States because of their willingness to distort their beliefs to suit their 
mission. Martyrs for Morocco adhere to the neo-fascist ideology of Takfir wal-Hijra, 
which allows followers to engage in any activity that advances jihad even if the Qur’an 
strictly forbids it. 
Men are permitted to shave their beards, drink alcoholic beverages, and adopt 
western culture to disguise their activities.13 The Takfir ideology is dominant at the 
Finnsbury Park mosque that Moussaoui and Reid attended and is also connected to al 
Qaeda’s top strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri.14 Rationalizing immoral and illegal activity to 
further jihad may have a strong appeal to the homegrown criminal element in prisons that 
would otherwise reject conversion under the rigid tenets of fundamentalist religion. 
Understanding the differences in fundamentalist forms of Islam is an inherent weakness 
in Western law enforcement and corrections culture, but important in identifying 





12 Sarah Bar, Sharon Marek, Blair Mersinger, and Louise Shelley, “An Investigation into the North 
African Crime-Terror Nexus,” Paper presented at the American University Transnational Crime and 
Terrorism Seminar, (Washington, D.C.: American University, December 19, 2005), at 
http://www.american.edu/traccc/resources/publications/students/bar01.pdf (Accessed March 17, 2007). 
13 Bruce Livesey, “The Salifist Movement,” PBS Frontline, January 25, 2005 at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html (Accessed March 11, 2007). 
14 Elliot, “Shoe Bomber’s World,” 47-50. 
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C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To improve our overall homeland security detection and prevention capabilities, 
this thesis identifies gaps in intelligence collection and reporting of extremist activities in 
America’s prisons and the best practices to address the problem. The specific questions it 
asks are: What gaps exist in intelligence collection and reporting of extremist activities in 
America’s prisons? What role do Security Threat Intelligence Units play in identifying, 
collecting, and reporting of information and intelligence on prison radicalization? What is 
the relationship between criminal gangs and radical extremists in prisons? How should 
prison staff be trained to cope with prison radicalization? 
D. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
 Prison radicalization is generating a great deal of interest as evidenced by the 
number of newspaper and magazine articles on the topic in the past few years. As the 
public and academia become more aware of the threat that exists inside our prisons, the 
pressure to come up with an effective response will present a challenge for homeland 
security leaders. Tracking ideological extremist activity in prisons by developing a 
strategy for intelligence collection and reporting will represent the first step in breaking 
the cycle of radicalization. This research contributes to the academic literature on prison 
radicalization by going beyond recognizing the danger to homeland security and 
recommending policy options for state and federal correctional institutions to counter the 
threat. 
The primary audience for this research are senior management level officials in 
both state and federal corrections. This thesis adds to the growing body of literature by 
assessing what experts in the field believe the extent of the problem to be and the current 
best practices being employed to combat the threat. The results should encourage 
corrections and law enforcement officials to narrow the gap in the intelligence function 
by identifying training opportunities, strengthening interagency communication, and 





                                                
E.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section briefly discusses the literature underpinning the topic of 
radicalization in America’s prisons and the associated uncertainty created from gaps in 
intelligence collection and reporting as it relates to the conversion process; the 
relationship between security threat groups and extremists; and the need to identify and 
monitor the threat to national security.  
Although extremist activity in prisons has been discussed among law enforcement 
for many years, there is limited academic literature directly related to this thesis. The 
literature is divided into three categories: government reports that provide a demographic 
framework for prison population and identifying prison radicalization; scholarly 
commentary on the social forces that influence religious conversion to radical Islam; and 
non-governmental reports that describe the relationships between criminals and 
extremists in prisons.  
The government reports are subdivided into FBI and Department of Justice 
reviews of the radical Islamic influence in prisons and expert testimony before Senate 
committees by government officials that identify a possible nexus between extremists and 
criminal gangs. There are more than 162,000 prisoners currently incarcerated in the 
federal prison system nationwide.15 In a 2004 report on Muslim religious service 
providers the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) estimates that “about six percent of the 
total population seek Islamic religious services.”16 Using the definition of Security Threat 
Groups (STG) as the standard of reference, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that 
12% of the total prison population engages in illegal activities as a group.17 In this survey 
277 state prisons in forty-five states were used to survey 13,986 inmates about their gang 
activity.18 Not surprisingly, 91% were repeat offenders, 69% engaged in illegal drug 
 
15 Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Population, at http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (Accessed 
September 7, 2006). 
16 U.S. DOJ, OIG, 5. 
17 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State Prison Inmates 1991 




                                                
transactions, and 73% were directly involved in violent offenses.19 As of June 2005 there 
were 1,438,701 inmates in state and federal prisons, which would put the number of 
inmates in STG status at 172,644 assuming there is no change in the percent of the total 
population that meets the criteria. The number of prison converts to Islam is estimated to 
be between 300,000 and 350,000 nationally and is growing about 10 percent each year.20 
These numbers present a considerable problem for law enforcement if connections 
continue to develop between terrorists groups and criminal gangs. 
Islamic services are provided mostly by volunteers and contractors due to the 
shortage of Muslim chaplains in the BOP system. Where volunteers and contractors are 
not available then other inmates lead Islamic services. In the BOP report, the Inspector 
General sharply criticized the oversight of Islamic religious service providers citing that 
“ample opportunity exists for them to deliver inappropriate and extremist messages 
without supervision from BOP staff members.”21 This provides extremists with the 
chance to seek out and cultivate potential recruits that will embrace the radical Islamic 
ideology.  
Conversion is the first stage in the radicalization process. A May 2006 FBI 
Intelligence Assessment analyzed the radicalization process and broke it down to four 
steps that could lead an individual to participate in a terrorist attack. In the second stage, 
the strength of the new commitment is tested through separation from the convert’s 
former life and embracing the new ideology.22 Prison prevents these individuals from 
traveling abroad to immerse themselves in the Islamic culture so their sole influence is 
limited to the ideology of the extremist imam and whatever propaganda gets past prison 
officials. Islam in this context is frequently distorted to “encompass prison values such as 
 
19 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State Prison Inmates 1991 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1993), 20. 
20 San Francisco State University, Center for Integration and Improvement of Journalism, Media 
Guide to Islam, September 2004, at http://mediaguidetoislam.sfsu.edu/intheus/06c_converts.htm (Accessed 
August 24, 2006). Siraj Islam Mufti, “Islam in American Prisons,” IslamOnline, August 31, 2001, at 
http://www.islamonline.net/english/views/2001/08/article20.shtml (Accessed August 24, 2006). 
21 U.S. DOJ, OIG, 3. 
22 U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Counterterrorism Division, The Radicalization Process: From 
Conversion to Jihad (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 2006), 6-7. FOUO. 
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gangs and loyalty to other inmates”23 and is referred to as Prison Islam. The report 
maintains that the radicalization process does not produce direct terrorist action in each 
case and the cycle can be broken or halted at any point.  
The FBI has conducted investigations on criminal enterprises with direct 
connections to terrorism, both domestically and abroad.  In testimony before the Senate 
Intelligence Committee in February 2005, FBI Director Robert Mueller described 
increasing concern about the connections between organized crime and terrorism. A 
transcript of that testimony provides insight to the nexus of the future threat: “Middle 
Eastern Criminal Enterprises involved in the organized theft and resale of infant formula 
pose not only an economic threat, but a public health threat to infants, and a potential 
source of material support to a terrorist organization.”24 The organizing of extremists 
with prison gangs known to engage in continuing criminal enterprise inside and outside 
of prisons should be of particular concern for law enforcement yet little research exists to 
define the extent of the current threat. 
The government reports are useful in describing the threat that extremists in 
America’s prison system pose to the pool of potential recruits and ultimately to society at 
large, but they fall short in recommending a strategy to manage the risk. Corrections and 
law enforcement officials should be working toward a unified approach to share 
intelligence and disrupt efforts to radicalize and recruit inmates in support of terrorist 
activities. 
While the phenomenon of prison radicalization is not new, it has only recently 
earned the attention of the academic community and consists mostly of anecdotal 
chronicles of high-profile extremists. Richard Reid, Jose Padilla, and Levar Washington 
represent a dangerous trend of converts to Islam who turned into active terrorists and 
were heavily influenced by radical ideology while in prison. Empirical data on the subject 
of radicalization of prison inmates is limited and the connection between terrorists and 
recruiting in U.S. prisons has not received much attention in homeland security research. 
 
23 U.S. DOJ, OIG, 8. 
24 Robert S. Mueller, III, Testimony of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, before the Senate 
Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 16, 2005, 3 at 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm (Accessed August 30, 2006). 
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There are several reasons for the gap in knowledge and they include a fundamental 
failure to recognize the threat, the natural reluctance of extremist elements in the United 
States to identify themselves for public scrutiny, and prison officials’ unwillingness to 
acknowledge that a systemic problem may exist and allow access to researchers who may 
draw attention to policy failures. In the studies that are available, the vast majority of 
Muslim prison converts sampled were African-American and selection bias may play a 
role in the results.25 
Randy Borum and Michael Gelles are associate professors for the Department of 
Mental Health Law and Policy at the University of South Florida and they report that al 
Qaeda’s interest in dirty bomb suspect Jose Padilla indicates that terrorist organizations 
may be seeking to recruit homegrown Islamic converts willing to support attacks against 
the United States, either by direct participation or through material support.26 Any 
discussion of clandestine recruitment of homegrown converts in prison requires an 
examination of the social influences that contribute to understanding the underlying cause 
in the conversion process. The literature collectively identifies identity crisis as a 
necessary variable in the transformation to radical ideology. According to Rhodes 
College social scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz: 
…socialization (or resocialization) takes place as individuals learn about 
the ideology of the movement. The process is intended to alter the values 
of the individual so that self-interest is defined in accordance with the 
goals and beliefs of the movement ideology. In addition, movements foster 
identity construction (or reconstruction) and encourage social bonds that 
facilitate joining by creating new social network and solidarity to 
encourage individuals to stay the course and continue training.27
This concept is supported by RAND analysts Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly when 
they describe Richard Reid as undergoing “identity transformation” during his prison 
conversion to radical Islam and subsequent failed attempt to detonate explosives aboard 
 
25 U.S. DOJ, OIG, 5. 
26 Randy Borum and Michael Gelles, “Al-Qaeda’s Operational Evolution: Behavioral and 
Organizational Perspectives,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 23, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 480. 
27 Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause,” 16. 
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an American Airlines flight in December 2001.28 This transformation process is 
noteworthy because little training exists for correctional officers to recognize and report 
emerging associations between extremists and impressionable recruits.  
In 2002, the Anti-Defamation League published a report entitled “Dangerous 
Convictions: An Introduction to Extremist Activities in Prisons” where it identifies the 
internal sources of radicalization within prisons. The report concludes that prison gangs 
play a major role in the spread of fundamentalist ideology. The ADL’s study makes the 
attempt to link divergent ideological extremists through common cause association. 
The evidence that larceny often trumps racial purity can be seen when 
gangs of different racial make-ups form “alliances” in order to strengthen 
their control of money-making ventures behind prison walls. The Aryan 
Brotherhood, for example, evinces considerable hostility towards black 
prison gangs, such as the Black Guerilla Family, as might be expected. 
However, it is broadly aligned with the Mexican Mafia, in order to control 
the drug trade to mutual benefit (and as a result opposes the rivals of the 
Mexican Mafia, La Nuestra Familia).29
 The ADL report lightly touches upon what may be the most significant internal 
threat to our domestic security when it comes to radicalization in prisons. This emerging 
threat is consistent with a more recent George Washington University/University of 
Virginia report on prisoner radicalization that draws attention to the lack of systematic 
intelligence collection and information sharing on the association between organized 
prison gangs and international terrorist organizations.30 The report characterizes the most 
likely terrorist recruit as young, unemployed, alienated, lacking self-esteem, with a desire 
 
28 Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly, “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” in The McGraw-
Hill Homeland Security Handbook, ed. by David G. Kamien (New York, McGraw-Hill, 2006), 86. 
29 Anti-Defamation League, Dangerous Conviction: An Introduction to Extremist Activities in Prisons 
(Washington, D.C.: ADL, 2002), 10, at http://www.adl.org/learn/Ext_Terr/dangerous_convictions.pdf 
(Accessed September 2, 2006). 
30 Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, Jan Lane, Sharon Cardash, Josh Magarik, Andrew Whitehead, 
Jeffrey Raynor, Arnold Bogis, & Gina Lohr, “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner 
Radicalization,” A Special Report by the Homeland Security Policy Institute at The George Washington 
University and the Critical Incident Analysis Group at The University of Virginia (Washington, D.C.: The 
George Washington University, September 2006), 8, at 
http://www.heathsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/out_of_the_shadows.pdf (Accessed 
September 19, 2006). 
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to belong to a group.31 This seemingly would include the vast majority of the U.S. prison 
population, yet another study states the “the person who becomes a terrorist in Western 
countries is generally both intellectual and idealistic.”32 The lack of agreement about the 
demographics of terrorist recruits is an indicator of the limited data associated with 
modern domestic terrorism and the evolving nature of the threat. More research is needed 
to make the connection of alliances between domestic criminal gangs and extremists in 
prison.  
The literature reveals that some states have more of a concern than others. 
According to Time magazine’s Los Angeles Bureau Chief Terry McCarthy, there are 
more than 100,000 gang members in California prisons being released back into society 
at a rate of about 3% each month.33 However, as of June 2005 the total prison population 
in California was 166,532, which indicates that 60% of the state’s prison population now 
falls into the STG classification.34 This is much higher than the 12% national average and 
comparable with data collected by the National Gang Crime Research Center.35 It is 
likely that states such as California, Illinois, New York, and Texas have much higher 
STG prison density rates due to the higher ratio of total gang members in those states. As 
discussed above, the literature has failed to adequately address the topic of radicalization 




31 Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, Jan Lane, Sharon Cardash, Josh Magarik, Andrew Whitehead, 
Jeffrey Raynor, Arnold Bogis, & Gina Lohr, “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner 
Radicalization,” A Special Report by the Homeland Security Policy Institute at The George Washington 
University and the Critical Incident Analysis Group at The University of Virginia (Washington, D.C.: The 
George Washington University, September 2006), 8, at 
http://www.heathsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/out_of_the_shadows.pdf (Accessed 
September 19, 2006), 1. 
32 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? 
(Washington, D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999), 24. 
33 Terry McCarthy, “L.A. Gangs are Back,” Time, September 3, 2001, 46. 
34 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005, 
NCJ 213133 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2006), 3. 
35 George W. Knox, “The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STGs) in American Prisons 
Today: Recent Research Findings from the 2004 Prison Gang Survey,” National Gang Crime Research 
Center (2005), at http://www.ngcrc.com/corr2006.html (Accessed September 3, 2006). 
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and radical fundamentalists. This condition offers corrections and law enforcement 
officials important policy and strategy challenges as it relates to preparation and 
prevention efforts in homeland security.  
 While prison radicalization is not a new problem worldwide, it is becoming a 
contemporary threat for domestic security in the United States. The existing literature 
reflects a problem that has not received much attention until recently and a few 
uncertainties and gaps exist beyond simply identifying the problem. These gaps are of 
particular importance to federal and state prison policymakers who are trying to develop 
strategies to prevent and respond to radicalization. Is the Security Threat Group (STG) 
model the best available method to identify and track extremists in prisons or should the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons concentrate on the Imam-vetting procedures as the best method 
to reduce radicalization? These questions have yet to be answered and the existing 
literature does not sufficiently address the effectiveness of various policy considerations. 
This research attempts to fill that void by discussing resource commitments, potential 
unintended consequences, and cost considerations. 
F. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
 Chapter II explains the methodology used to conduct the analysis. In particular, it 
describes the process of constructing the survey instrument, sample selection, mechanics 
of distributing and collecting survey data, and the data analysis. The analytical 
methodology includes descriptive and inferential statistical methods, in addition to 
identifying potential biases and limitations. 
 Chapter III details the results of the survey and is comprised of a descriptive and 
inferential statistical analysis to identify patterns and define what the survey population 
believes is significant about the problem of prison radicalization.  
 From this data, interviews of professionals with special insights into the topic is 
conducted to add qualitative observations for a more in-depth understanding of the 
influences that affect prison radicalization, which is reported in Chapter IV.  
Chapter V provides an analysis of the quantitative and qualitative results in the 
previous two chapters.  
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 Based on the findings in the previous chapters and what the existing research 
shows to be viable solutions, Chapter VI makes policy recommendations to address 
prison radicalization and explores potential problems that may arise during 
implementation. Any problems with the data or limitations of the research are addressed 





























A. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
To gather data that help to answer the research questions, an electronic survey 
was used to assess the attitudes of experts in the field of corrections and law enforcement 
toward radicalization activities in state and federal prisons. The intention was to have mid 
to senior management level personnel in these disciplines complete the survey, but this 
may not have been possible in some cases so there was some flexibility in who actually 
completed the survey.  
The population for the survey was state prison, local/county jail, and detention 
facility officials together with law enforcement practitioners who have knowledge of and 
responsibilities for prison operations. To reduce the political anxiety associated with 
public sector officials commenting on controversial topics, all surveys were coded to 
protect the identity of the respondent and their agency.  
The target audience was contacted via mass email with an invitation letter and 
asked to access the survey via a commercial website. SPSS software was used to conduct 
a descriptive and inferential statistical analysis of the responses to identify significant 
correlations and relationships. 
B. SURVEY DATA COLLECTION 
To effectively access a statistically relevant audience, the American Correctional 
Association and the North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents agreed 
to assist in the study by encouraging their membership to complete the survey. 
Recruitment of participants was conducted via e-mail bulletins whereby an invitation e-
mail described the purpose and scope of the study and contained a link to the survey. 
Interested participants could then click the posted link and complete the survey. The 
survey system then saved participants’ responses to a MySQL database that also serves as 
a data management tool, which aids the researcher in correlating the data and supporting 
analysis. The survey was active for approximately six weeks. 
 16 
 
After data collection was completed, survey responses were exported from the 
survey system’s MySQL database to an Excel file. A program was then written in the 
SPSS syntax command language to read in the raw Excel file and format it for data 
analysis. This included converting character responses (e.g. “y” and “n”) to numeric 
responses (e.g. 1 and 0), and adding variable and coding labels. 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
Survey items relating to each of the four research questions are as follows: 
1. Items Q3, Q4, Q5, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q13, Q14, and Q15. 
2. Items Q6, Q7, Q8, and Q9. 
3. Items Q1 and Q2. 
4. Items Q16, Q17, Q18, Q19, Q20, and Q21. 
Due to the exploratory nature of this small survey, data analyses were confined 
mostly to descriptive statistics and correlation/regression analyses. Descriptive statistics 
consisted of means and standard deviations for ratio/interval scale data (Q9, Q22, Q23) 
and frequencies and proportions (%) for ordinal/nominal scale data. 
Inferential statistics consisted of Spearman correlation, as well as Chi-square tests 
of independence, and logistic regressions. Spearman correlations were used when both 
variables were ordinal in nature, while the Chi-square test was reserved for analyses, 
which involved a dichotomous variable or other categorical variable. In cases where the 
Chi-square tests indicated a significant relationship between a dichotomous variable and 
ordinal variable(s), logistic regression was used to compute the odds ratios for the 
dichotomous outcome (e.g. yes/no response). For research questions #1, #2, and #4, these 
tests were applied as required to explore detailed aspects of each research question. 
For research question #3, correlation matrices were generated using the Spearman 
non-parametric correlation test to examine inter-relationships among ratings of prison 
gang and extremist group activity in prisons (Q1) and strength of external connections 
outside prisons (Q2). Because of using multiple correlations, more conservative limits 
were set on statistical significance for these tests. For a sample size of fifty, and 
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specifying a power of .80 and confidence level of .95, Cohen36 shows that a meaningful 
correlation would be r=.4 or greater. Given that multiple correlations were required to 
explore the relationships among the different gangs/extremist groups, a further restriction 
was placed on the significance value (p<.005) to guard against spurious correlations. 
 Open-ended questions: Q14 and Q15 (pertaining to the receiving of information/ 
intelligence on extremist activity), and Q18 and Q20 (pertaining to STG education and 
training needs) were analyzed by generating a list of categories according to the most 
common themes present, as determined by an objective observer. Individual responses 
were then coded according to this list.  
All statistical analyses were conducted with SPSS for Windows (Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences, SPSS Inc. Chicago IL). 
 
 
36 J. Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed. (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence 
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III.  RESULTS 
A.  SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Forty-nine surveys were completed and submitted. Table 1 gives a general 
overview of the prisons sampled in this survey. Number of individuals incarcerated 
ranged between 16 and 14000, having a mean (± SD) of 1656 (± 2395). Numbers of 
sworn employees ranged between 0 and 3000, with a mean of 283 (± 484), and numbers 
of non-sworn employees ranged between 0 and 1109, with a mean of 189 (± 269). 
Although there were no survey respondents from federal prisons, the above data suggest 
the sample was diverse, ranging from state prisons (n=34) to a smaller number of 
local/county jails and prisons (n=12), private facilities (n=2) and a detention center (n=1). 
These latter descriptors were provided by respondents answering the “Other” category.  
Table 1 also shows the breakdown of prison population and manpower for state 
and other facilities. Means and ranges of incarcerated individuals, as well as non-sworn 
personnel, were similar between these two types of facilities. The mean number of sworn 
personnel was smaller for state prisons (184 ± 201) compared to other prisons (501 ± 
770), but as one might expect with such high variances, an independent samples t-test 
failed to detect any significant difference (p>.05). It may therefore be concluded that the 
two prison types sampled in this survey were similar in terms of inmate population size 
and numbers of personnel. 
B. RESULTS 
1. Research Question #1:  
What gaps exist in intelligence collection and reporting of extremist activities in 
America's prisons? 
Rating of sources of information and intelligence on extremist group activity 
 Table 2 summarizes the ratings of various sources of information and intelligence 
on extremist group activity. The most frequent response category for each information/ 
intelligence source is indicated by the bold text in Table 2. Most responded “Don’t 
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know” to the usefulness of information/ intelligence sources from federal agencies (FBI 
classified reports: 57%, FBI unclassified reports: 51%; BOP reports: 49%, and Other 
federal agencies: 39%) and State office of Homeland Security (31%). Of those who 
reported other than “Don’t know” for these sources of information/ intelligence, the most 
frequent ratings were “Fair” (classified and unclassified FBI reports) to “Good” (BOP, 
other federal agencies, State office of Homeland Security), as shown by the blue text 
highlight. 
 Corrections and law enforcement professional associations were reported most 
frequently (45% and 35%, respectively) as “Good” sources of information, as was Media 
(publications/ print)(37%), Internet (31%), Books/academic journals (47%) and 
Informants (29%). Radical group publications were also reported as being a “Good” 
source of information by 25% of respondents, but more than 26% reported “Don’t 
know,” again suggesting prison officials may have limited access to such materials. 
These results suggest that information sources fall into two broadly defined 
categories among the prisons sampled (all non-federal prisons). Usefulness of federal 
sources was dominated by the “Don’t know” response, and thus may be considered 
limited access sources. More accessible sources (such as media, internet, books/journals, 
corrections professional associations) may be considered broad access sources. Of these, 
corrections professional associations were rated the best source of information and the 
media the worst.  
Interaction with JTTF regarding extremist group activity 
As shown in Table 3, most respondents (49%) reported “Never” having 
interaction with JTTF, and 40% reported “Seldom” having interaction with JTTF. Only 
8% reported “Frequent” interaction and 2% (1 respondent) reported “Very frequent” 
interaction. Of the 25 who responded other than “Never”, thirteen indicated the nature of 
this interaction. Five (38%) of these indicated this interaction was related to extremist 
activity. 
Table 4 shows the relationship between frequency of interaction of JTTFs 
(collapsed to “Seldom” and “Frequently” or “Very Frequently”) and the nature of the 
reported activity (extremist activity or not). Although the sample is small (as only 13 
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participants responded to Q4) the Chi-Square test indicated that more frequent interaction 
with JTTFs was associated with reporting extremist activity (x2=9.24 p=.002). A 
significant correlation (Spearman) was also found between frequency of interaction with 
JTTFs (non-collapsed), and number of persons assigned to STIUs (Q9) (r=.351, p=.013). 
While the small sample does not permit further exploration of the nature of this 
relationship, it does suggest that a fuller complement of personnel dedicated to STIUs 
enables more frequent communication with JTTFs. 
Handling of information/ intelligence on extremist group activity in prisons 
 Data in Table 5 describe the internal handling of information/intelligence on 
extremist group activity in the prisons sampled. Most (49%) indicate that extremist group 
activity is “Seldom” reported, followed by 35% indicating it is “Frequently” reported. Six 
percent (3 respondents) indicated “Very frequent” reporting of extremist group activity 
and 10% (5 respondents) indicated “Never.” Of those responding (41 of 49 respondents), 
“Written report” was the most common method of reporting (46%), followed by 
“Verbally” (29%) and “Electronically” (24%). 
 How frequently extremist activity was reported (collapsed to “Never/Seldom” and 
“Frequently” or “Very Frequently”) was significantly related to whether or not the prison 
has written policies on reporting extremist activity (Q16) (x2=11.6, p=.001), and to what 
extent radicalization is covered in their basic certification curriculum (Q17) (x2=9.1, 
p=.028). These relationships were positive, indicating that the frequency of reporting is 
dependent upon the appropriate policies and certification training being in place. Logistic 
regression showed that prisons with written policies in place related to identifying and 
reporting extremist activity were 20 times more likely to frequently or very frequently 
report extremist activity (Odds ratio= 20.4; 95% CI: 2.4-175, p=.006), while having 
adequate coverage of radicalization in the basic certification curriculum were almost 4 
times as likely to frequently or very frequently report extremist activity (Odds ratio=3.89; 
95% CI:1.44-10.5, p=.006). As indicated by the rather broad confidence intervals, the 
small cell sizes warrant caution when generalizing these data. These results are 
summarized in Tables 6 and 7. 
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Data in Table 8 describe the external handling of information/intelligence on 
extremist group activity in the prisons sampled. Thirty-three (67%) of 49 respondents 
indicated that the information is shared with law enforcement outside the prison. Ten 
percent indicated the information was not shared externally, and 22% were uncertain. 
Thirty-four indicated how this information was shared. Responses were relatively evenly 
distributed over the response categories. Of the thirty-four who responded, method 
external reporting was 25% “Written report”, 25% “Verbally”, 21% “Electronically”, 
18% “Intelligence report” and 9% “Uncertain”. 
Interestingly, sharing of information with law enforcement was found to have a 
significant relationship (x2=18.6, p=.001) with respondents’ attitudes regarding the 
degree to which adequate training is available to address the problem of radicalization. 
The data in Table 9 suggest that prisons that share information on extremist activity with 
outside law enforcement are more likely to have adequate training in place (or believe 
this to be so) for dealing with the problem of radicalization in prisons. 
Open-ended questions Q14 and Q15 were reviewed and found to be composed of 
eight categories or themes, as summarized in Table 10. For question Q14, pertaining to 
how information is received from other areas of responsibility, forms of communication 
were somewhat uniformly distributed across verbal, written, electronic, or combinations 
thereof. Ten percent indicated they receive no information from other areas of 
responsibility. For question Q15 (also in Table 10), similarly, the forms of receiving 
intelligence from other prisons were primarily written, electronic or combinations of 
various forms of media, with less frequent verbal communication. Sixteen percent 
reported received no information or intelligence from other prisons. 
2. Research Question #2:  
What role do Security Threat Intelligence Units play in identifying, collecting, 
and reporting of information and intelligence on prison radicalization? 
Security Threat Intelligence Unit (STIU) 
Nine of the 49 respondents (18%) were themselves assigned to an STIU. Thirty-
seven of 49 (76%) reported their facility as having a dedicated STIU. Job responsibilities 
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of personnel in these 37 STIU consisted of the following (in order of prevalence): 
Intelligence gathering (92%), Investigation (81%), Liaison with law enforcement outside 
prison (73%), Analysis/reporting (70%) and Training other personnel (68%). Only 
sixteen of the 37 (43%) who reported having a dedicated STIU also reported having 
increased the number of personnel in the last five years. These data are shown in Table 
11. 
Numbers of personnel assigned to STIU are shown at the bottom of Table 11. 
Four respondents did not enter a value for personnel assigned to STIUs, or entered a zero 
for all four employee types. Also, three respondents indicated a very large (>20, 
maximum 200) number of assigned personnel (sworn, full-time). The resulting 
distribution did not lend itself to parametric descriptives (means and standard deviations), 
therefore, the data were classified according to “Did not respond”, “1-4”, “5-9”, “10-19”, 
and “>20”. The majority of respondents (57%) indicated between 1-4 persons assigned to 
their facilities’ STIU.  
A note of caution is prudent as some respondents who claimed not to have a 
dedicated STIU (answered “no” to Q6) entered values in the fields for employee numbers 
assigned to an STIU. This in combination with the zeros entered for those claiming to 
have an STIU suggests some participants may not have fully understood the question 
regarding the number of personnel. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a dedicated STIU was found to have a trend toward 
a significant association with the extent to which radicalization is covered in the basic 
certification curriculum (Q17) (x2=3.57, p=.059) and the adequacy of available training 
(Q19) (x2=5.50, p=.064). However, when examined with logistic regression, a unit 
increase in response to Q17 (e.g. from “Somewhat Covered” to “Covered”) indicated a 5-
fold likelihood that a dedicated STIU was in place (Odds ratio: 5.3; 95% CI: 1.55-18.1, 
p=.008). Similarly, a unit increase in the adequacy of training available (e.g. from “Not 
Adequate” to “Adequate”) indicated more than a 3-fold likelihood that a dedicated STIU 





linkage between the existence between the existence of dedicated STIUs and the degree 
of training available to address the problem of prison radicalization. These data are 
summarized in Tables 12 and 13. 
3. Research Question #3:  
What is the relationship between criminal gangs and radical extremists in 
prisons? 
Level and extent of extremist activity in prisons sampled 
 Forty-eight of the 49 respondents rated the level of activity of different extremist 
group types in their prison (Table 14), and rated the corresponding strength of connection 
to their colleagues outside of prison for these groups (Table 15).  
In general, activity levels of extremist groups and gangs were rated mostly 
“Somewhat active” or “Not present.” Prison gangs (such as Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, 
etc.) were generally the most active, with 18% reporting “Very Active”, 27% reporting 
“Active” and 45% reporting “Somewhat active.” Religious (Muslim, Christian, etc.) and 
Right-wing (Racists, fascists, Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.) groups followed closely 
behind with 8% and 6% reporting “Very active, 14% and 14% reporting “Active,” and 
57% and 43% reporting “Somewhat active,” respectively. The majority reported “Not 
present” for Left-wing (ALF, ELF, Weather Underground, etc.)(82%), Anti-government 
(67%), and Other (88%) types of extremist groups Other groups (5 in total), rated as 
“Somewhat active” consisted of local/temporal gangs and Mafia groups (Mafiosi and 
Mexican). 
Table 15 shows that a similar ranking exists for the strength of connection these 
groups have to their colleagues outside prison, with prison gangs having the strongest 
external connections, with 27% reporting “Very strong,” 20% reporting “Strong,” and 
37% reporting “Somewhat strong.” Religious and Right-wing groups followed again with 
8% reporting “Very strong,” 14% reporting “Strong,” and 47% and 31% reporting 
“Somewhat strong,” respectively. However, 31% and 47% reported “Not present” for an 




reported “Not present” for Left-wing groups (84%), Anti-government groups (76%), and 
Other (94%) groups, consistent with the previous responses regarding group activity 
levels. 
Inter-relationships Among Active Extremist Groups 
 Data in Tables 16 and 17 show the correlation among responses to the items of 
question Q1 and Q2, respectively, on the survey. While correlation analysis does not infer 
cause and effect, it can show where associations exist. Correlations in Table 16 show that 
religious activity is associated with prison gang activity (r=.458, p=.001) and anti-
government group activity (r=.405, p=.004). Associations between strength (or weakness) 
of activity were also present among the right-wing, left-wing, anti-government, and other 
groups. Correlations in Table 17 show that strength of connections to extremist groups’ 
colleagues outside of prison is highly correlated among almost all groups. This finding 
suggests that where mechanisms exist for outside connections, those mechanisms are 
exploited by all groups. 
4. Research Question #4:  
How should prison staff be trained to cope with prison radicalization? 
Preparedness for handling extremist group activity in prisons 
 Thirty-two of the 49 respondents (65%) indicated their prison has written policies 
related to identifying and reporting extremist group activity (Q17), as shown in Table 18. 
Responses to whether radicalization was covered in the certification curriculum, also 
shown in Table 18, indicated it was most frequently “Somewhat covered” (47%), 
followed by “Not covered” (22%), “Covered” (20%), “Uncertain (6%) and “Well 
covered” (4%). 
 Twenty-six of 49 respondents (53%) viewed available training (Q19) to be 
“Somewhat adequate”, followed by “Not adequate” (29%), and “Adequate” (18%). These 
data are shown in Table 19. The most frequently identified barriers to adequate training 
were “Lack of local funding” (59%) and “Not high on priority list” (59%), and lesser but 




 When collapsed to dichotomous variables, and shown in Table 20, a significant 
relationship was found between responses to survey questions Q17 and Q19 (x2=12.3, 
p<.001). This relationship suggests that respondent attitudes about the adequacy of 
training are significantly linked to radicalization being covered in the basic certification 
curriculum. 
Open-ended questions Q18 and Q20 were reviewed and found to be composed of 
seven categories or themes, as summarized in Table 21.  For question Q18, pertaining to 
availability of education and training on indicators of radicalization/ extremist group 
activity, the two most frequent responses (22% each) were “Basic/ in-service training” 
and “None”. Sixteen percent indicated gang awareness/ identification training, while 14% 
indicated STG training. 
For question Q20, pertaining to the types of additional education and training that 
would be beneficial, the two most frequent responses (20% each) were for the “Don’t 
know” response and the “Current events/trend awareness” response category. This 
category theme included a number of responses that identified a desire to have access to 
more up-to-date information on current events and trends. Sixteen percent identified 
“Radicalization identification/ awareness training” as beneficial. Other response themes 
consisted of “General education/class room” (14%) and “Info-sharing/inter-agency 















Although the survey answered a number of questions about prison radicalization, 
it also raised a few points that merit further investigation to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of the problem. Responses, comments and analysis of the survey revealed 
the three key subjects of intelligence, training, and the relationships between gangs and 
extremists as having important relationships that influence radicalization in prisons. To 
gain a better understanding of the dynamics that affect the relationships in each of these 
areas, representatives with special insight into these topics were solicited for personal 
interview. Initial requests for interview were made by email where the nature of the 
inquiry was disclosed and that the interview would be for attribution. Each of the 
interviewees was selected for their expertise in the topic areas and also to provide a 
balanced opinion that represented the federal, state and local points of view. The 
interviews were guided by a standard set of questions, but because of their special insight 
to different areas that affect prison radicalization the flow and direction of the interviews 
were unique to each individual, which led the discussion in divergent directions. The 
interviewees included Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security 
at The George Washington University; Executive Director Arthur A. Leonardo of the 
North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents (NAAWS), and Lieutenant 
John P. Sullivan from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. 
 Prior to joining The George Washington University, Frank J. Cilluffo served as 
Special Assistant to President George W. Bush and principal advisor to DHS Secretary 
Tom Ridge as he directed the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. He has 
testified before the United States Congress on several occasions, including September 
2006 on prison radicalization. In his opinion, the culture and group behavior in 
networked organizations like gangs and terror groups offers charismatic personalities in 
prisons a chance to cull vulnerable inmates into a radical ideology through social 
bonding. Prisons have always been incubators for radical ideas where charismatic 
personalities such as Adolf Hitler create disquisitions like Mein Kampf, which are meant 
to influence followers toward a radical ideology by creating a strong social connection 
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with a disenfranchised audience. While he agrees that profiling terrorists is not a 
productive endeavor, Mr. Cilluffo cites this creation of social bonds as a common factor 
that links the culture of gangs with terrorist groups and one that presents a challenge for 
homeland security leaders to understand.  
 This influence that individual charismatic leaders have is a trend that he thinks is 
an indicator of what makes prison radicalization a unique homeland security problem. 
Much like a criminal prison gang, which is characterized by a relatively flat 
organizational structure where leaders are chosen based on their influence, the followers 
of Sunni Islam do not have a central authoritative religious figure equivalent to the 
Ayatollah with Shi’a Muslims or the Pontiff in the Catholic faith. Mr. Cilluffo points out 
that this allows individual charismatic leaders to have an effect on how their radical 
message can be shaped. This is where homeland security leaders have to be critical 
thinkers in understanding that part of the solution will likely have to come from outside 
the law enforcement discipline. He suggests that we will have to enlist those that can use 
their knowledge of the Qur’an to support an anti-extremist message against 
fundamentalists that are interpreting scripture in a radical way.  
 Mr. Cilluffo thinks that people have not stepped back to look at the contours of 
what prison radicalization is and what it is not, therefore we need to move beyond the 
anecdotal evidence to get people to pay attention to the problem. He acknowledges that 
there is not an abundance of research available on the subject and points out that what is 
available is not always accessible to practitioners in corrections and law enforcement. 
This can be attributed to the complexities of radicalization in general, the sensitivities of 
associating the effects of religion and terrorism, and the operational realities that have an 
effect on prisons in general. Mr. Cilluffo recognizes that managing an institution that is 
saturated with the worst that society has to offer is a full time job for any warden. It is 
difficult to add yet another priority on an already overburdened prison administration that 
has their hands full just trying to keep prisoners from breaking out. 
 One area where Mr. Cilluffo suggests more research needs to be conducted is in 
understanding the processes of how someone goes from sympathizer to activist to an 
agent of violence. He suggests that understanding how networked organizations form, 
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operate, and how they break down from an anthropological perspective may give us an 
indication of how we can create strategies to counter extremists. For example, he noted 
that law enforcement developed informants from within the Cosa Nostra organization to 
instill a loss of confidence and trust that began to break the organization down after the 
rise to prominence that follow the prohibition era. Although officials failed to completely 
remove the organization, their understanding of the importance of trust within their 
leadership helped to reduce the threat and keep the proliferation under control. Cilluffo 
also suggested that the organized crime model may be more effective against prison 
radicalization than the conventional counterterrorism model. 
 When it comes to intelligence Mr. Cilluffo believes that misunderstandings at all 
levels of government prevent information from being shared. He makes the point that 
officials cannot look at intelligence in the microcosms of prisons alone because the 
problem goes much deeper. State and local agencies have to get more involved in 
requirements to determine what the needs are while many at the federal level are 
mistaken that the information will come from the top-down when in reality it comes from 
the bottom-up. He suggests that security clearances are not the answer as some have 
proposed as being a solution to obtaining information and intelligence, but instead it is 
getting sensitive information into a usable format to deliver an actionable product. There 
is also a misperception that an abundance of intelligence exists that is not being shared by 
federal agencies which is not always the case. Mr. Cilluffo believes that corrections at the 
state and federal levels must get more involved in information sharing, but also thinks 
this push should come from within instead of externally. 
 Finally, Mr. Cilluffo thinks the experiences that the United Kingdom and France 
have with radicalization within prisons can be a valuable source of education for the 
United States. Globalization facilitated through the Internet makes the threat transnational 
so what happens in one country may have implications in another so we should pay 
attention to it. He concludes that  radicalization is a problem not limited to the confines of 
prison walls and we need to not only fight the structure alone, but also learn to 




 Arthur A. Leonardo has been the Executive Director of the North American 
Association of Wardens and Superintendents since 1995 and is a retired warden in the 
New York state correctional system. He also served as the Deputy Commissioner of 
Operations for five years where he gained valuable insight to the development of Islamic 
extremist influence in prisons. Mr. Leonardo believes that prisons are a good place to 
recruit terrorists because there are a lot of disaffected people who do not feel like they 
belong to anything and can be easily led. He related a historical perspective of the 
proliferation that New York State experienced in the 1970s and 1980s where Muslims in 
prisons were fighting each other. It was in the 1980s that foreign Muslims began to 
appear in U.S. prisons and most of those were of Eastern European descent with a few 
having an organized crime connection. Early on, prison officials did not recognize the 
difference between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and considered the Muslim movement to be 
simply another gang. In his opinion, this lack of Islamic cultural awareness and historical 
perspective is a problem that still affects the correctional system and should be a focus of 
training for officers. Mr. Leonardo suggested a national training academy or exchange 
programs with other countries as ways to soften the primary barriers of funding and few 
qualified trainers, which put a strain on state and local agencies. 
 When it comes to the interaction between gangs and extremists in prisons Mr. 
Leonardo believes their associations are almost exclusively involved in trying to further 
criminal activity. He related a story about the time immediately following the 9/11 
attacks in New York prisons where anyone that appeared to be an Islamic extremist had 
to be low key or face attacks because the other inmates felt a strong sense of patriotism. 
Although he thinks that most inmates would not knowingly participate in terrorist actions 
against the U.S., Mr. Leonardo acknowledges the possibility that gangs or lone wolves 
may be susceptible to commit terror acts on a “for hire” basis.  
 Mr. Leonardo supports the concept of STIUs as an effective strategy for 
monitoring, reporting and countering extremists in prisons. Their experience with gangs 
makes these units the logical choice as the primary resource to coordinate the effort, 
however he cautions that we already have much of the information we need to connect 
the dots but do not do a good job of communicating or sharing it well. In his opinion, the 
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information and intelligence sharing problem is more of a leadership issue than a 
technical or cultural limitation. Instead of pointing out poor examples he cited a strong 
model that he is familiar with that begins with good working relationships between the 
New York Department of Corrections, State Police, and the NYPD Anti-Terrorism 
Bureau created through formal and informal relationships. Leaders of each component 
have set aside their cultural biases long enough to share important information in an 
effort to make one of the prime targets for terrorism a better prepared. 
 One topic of discussion unique to Mr. Leonardo involved the possibility of using 
volunteers to perform tasks in prisons that would allow full time personnel to concentrate 
their efforts to reduce radicalization to operational functions. Shortly after the 9/11 
attacks he wrote a letter suggesting that thousands of retired officers were looking for 
things to do that would help New York cope with security concerns related to terrorism 
and that the Department of Corrections should consider taking advantage of a potentially 
valuable resource to augment existing personnel. Although he never received an answer 
to his request, Mr. Leonardo still thinks existing volunteer programs in prisons could be 
expanded to take advantage of the breadth in experience that retirees have, many of 
which still want to contribute on a limited basis. 
 Lieutenant John P. Sullivan serves as Director of the National Terrorism Early 
Warning Resource Center and is co-founder of the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early 
Warning (TEW) Group. A senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on 
Terrorism, he has managed intelligence and terrorism response activities as well as being 
a noted author on gangs and terrorism. When discussing the connections between 
criminal gangs and extremists identified in the survey responses, Lieutenant Sullivan 
points out that when gangs or terrorist groups use violence it is instrumental and meant to 
send a message to a particular audience. In the case of terrorist groups that message is 
often directed within the group to form cohesion or to mobilize people to a common 
purpose. For terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda Sullivan believes that the U.S. 





constituency that they seek to influence and use against us hoping that we will change our 
policies. Ultimately this results in the terrorist group gaining more power and perpetuates 
the life of the organization.   
Despite the fact that prison radicalization is an evolving phenomenon, Lieutenant 
Sullivan believes that we can learn from other countries that are experiencing far greater 
problems with radicalization in prisons. He noted that we still do not have a clear picture 
of the problem in the United Kingdom and France with Islamist extremists influencing 
other inmates, but it may benefit agencies in the U.S. to draw upon their experiences to 
increase our opportunities for training. Another subject that he suggested to be addressed 
is training on the dynamics of small group violence, particularly the social psychology of 
how these groups come together and how they emerge. Sullivan recommends taking 
advantage of training offered by the Israelis who are particularly effective at producing 
good intelligence products on extremists in and out of prison.  
Sullivan thinks that moderate Imams could be a valuable resource in prisons if 
they are properly integrated into the chaplaincy corps. This begins with establishing a 
good dialogue with local Imams and engaging them through mutual training and 
education. The Imams can help inmates and corrections staff understand Islam and its 
cultural practices while corrections personnel can train the Imams in prison policies and 
procedures so they understand the security concerns that impact the inmate’s daily life. 
Sullivan believes that this collaboration between Imams and correctional security is vital. 
Like Mr. Leonardo, Lieutenant Sullivan’s opinion is that the most common threat 
comes from the alliances that form between networked groups like gangs and extremists. 
In prison, inmates are exceptionally vulnerable, which makes them susceptible to 
recruitment into gangs or by extremist groups. He cautions that while the likelihood of 
homegrown terrorist collaboration is limited to material support through criminal 
enterprise, we do not know enough about the problem to discount the threat of a lone 
wolf buying into the radical ideology and participating in actual attacks.  
When asked about information sharing, Sullivan points out that what we are doing 
in intelligence is usually tactical rather than strategic intelligence. He does not discount 
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the value of tactical intelligence, but thinks there is more value in strategic intelligence to 
identify trends and patterns. Many times the barriers to information sharing are 
ineffective communication skills and the lack of established relationships. In discussion 
with the author it was determined that this represents more of a leadership issue than a 
technical or resource barrier. 
Sullivan is a proponent of building the informal relationships between agencies in 
order for the formal relationships to work effectively. He opined that administrators can 
mandate collection and reporting through written directives, but the way to make it 
effective and keep it going is by nurturing the informal relationships that cause people to 
want to share the information. Part of the problem can be attributed to bureaucratic 
competition between agencies and part of the problem is that we do not spend enough 
time in face-to-face conversation. He believes that intelligence reports are good, but there 
is no substitute for his monthly intelligence meetings where personal interaction often 
leads to connecting the dots between similar cases. Face-to-face interaction builds trust 
and leads to breaking down the cultural barriers that block information sharing. 
When asked about the best strategy to address prison radicalization, Sullivan 
recommended forming task forces of street gang officers, terrorism investigators, prison 
STIU personnel, and intelligence officers to conduct strategic intelligence endeavors. He 
acknowledged that creating such a task force would be the best-case scenario, but 
emphasized that the important aspect remains with developing the informal relationships 
between agencies. 
Finally, Lieutenant Sullivan believes that there is not a wealth of information on 
understanding radicalization and that the interest in the threat is just emerging. We need 
more significant research on the problem to develop training for the line officer inside 
prisons. Once effective training programs are created, mobile training teams could be 
developed to expose all prisons to the instruction. Ideally, he thinks that this should be 
accomplished at the federal level, but the initiative will likely be done at the state or local 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Government and academic research on radicalization is mostly directed to why 
individuals and groups connect with terrorists, but little effort is being focused on the 
more important issue of how those connections are made in order to understand the 
problem. In particular, concentrating on trying to identify a psychological profile of what 
makes people vulnerable to terrorist recruitment has not met with much success. There is 
a tendency on the part of laypersons and media analysts to apply the psychological 
profiling techniques used successfully in deductive and inductive criminal investigative 
assessments of criminal behavior to terrorists based on the heinous nature of their acts. 
The fallacy of this approach is that situational factors have more influence than the 
psychopathology of individual actors and trying to forensically dissect the mind of the 
terrorist personality in general is of little value in all but a few notable examples.37 
Instead of trying to develop profiles of terrorists or dissecting the psychopathology of the 
typical radicalized individual, some experts suggest that understanding social networks is 
a more productive predictor of terrorist behavior.38 Prisons provide an ideal setting for 
group interaction with extremists that seek to radicalize the population for support of 
terrorist operations. 
Jose Padilla, Levar Haley Washington, and Jeff Fort are documented examples of 
homegrown terrorists that began their path to radicalization while in prison, which led to 
their participation in material support of domestic terrorism. While the framework of the 
groups associated with these individuals is not on the level of al Qaeda, Hamas, or Aum 
Shinrikyo, the early warning signs of an organized effort for prison radicalization that 
presents a risk for terrorist attacks against the United States cannot be ignored. The 
common denominator in each of these cases is their strong connections to criminal and 
 
37 James N. Breckenridge and Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of 
Mass-Mediated Fear,” in Psychology of Terrorism, eds. Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, 
James N. Breckenridge, & Philip G. Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 126-127. 
38 Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004), 38; 
Gregory B. Saathoff, Testimony of Gregory B. Saathoff before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, September 19, 2006, 7, 
at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/091906Saathoff.pdf (Accessed June 5, 2007). 
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prison gangs. The strong external support structure associated with prison gangs and 
extremists that was revealed in the survey and supported in the interviews show that their 
similar organizational values and norms may appeal to inmates who are vulnerable to 
group influence and a need to be accepted.   
In describing terrorist networks, Sageman depicts the structure of the links and 
nodes of small world networks that characterize modern day terrorist groups as a social 
network, which is eerily similar to the structure of criminal gangs in the United States.39 
Both believe that their group actions are acceptable behavior for correcting perceived 
injustices and that the ends justify the means when using violence since theirs is a 
righteous cause. A sustained motivation to participate in activities that support terrorism 
requires regular reinforcement of group dynamics and prison provides an ideal setting 
since most inmates are incarcerated for more than a year.40 The issue for homeland 
security leaders to consider is “whether [these] group dynamics are sufficient in and of 
themselves to turn an average person into a terrorist or whether individual history and 
personality must be considered as well.”41  
 Although there is considerable evidence to support the contention that the vast 
majority of terrorists do not suffer from a diagnosable mental illness, there is little 
research on the associations of terrorists with inmates that may exhibit signs of criminal 
psychopathologies. In the Middle East where terrorist groups are prolific, Hamas, 
Hezbollah, and other well known terrorist groups make efforts to weed out psychopaths 
and sociopaths in the recruiting process since they will often be difficult to control.42 This 




39 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004), 137-140. 
40 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? 
(Washington, D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999), 24-25. 
41 Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 30. 
42 Andrea Kohn Maikovich, “A New Understanding of Terrorism Using Cognitive Dissonance 
Principles,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35, no. 4 (2005): 374-375; Hudson, Sociology and 
Psychology of Terrorism, 31-32. 
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from charitable organizations and not from criminal enterprise. This limits, but does not 
eliminate, the need for regular contact with the criminal element for primary financial 
support operations.  
 In Iraq and Afghanistan, we see the insurgency closely aligned with the black 
market and criminal enterprise.43 The bar seems to be set lower in this situation as the 
need for multiple attacks outweigh the other operational and mission security concerns. 
In other parts of the world the lines between criminality and terrorism become blurred 
even further when militant Islamist separatist groups like Abu Sayyaf focus on 
kidnappings and extortion as a means of coercion more so than conventional attacks 
designed to inflict mass casualties. The circumstances in the U.S. are more closely related 
to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict where the volume of attacks is inferior to the need for 
mission security. Including the criminal element into the strategic or mission planning 
phases subjects operational security to increased risks of detection. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the role of prison radicalization lies more in support operations 
than directly engaging in attacks. Comments from Sullivan and Leonardo corroborate this 
point of view and they caution that we should not underestimate the link between crime 
and international terrorism.44 The ability of a criminal gang to generate money through 
drug sales, property crimes, fraud, counterfeiting, and robbery has more appeal in the 
U.S. where the criminal justice system is overloaded with cases and usually willing to 
consider plea bargains for those apprehended in all but the most egregious cases. This 
dynamic increases exponentially for juvenile offenders. Although the interviewees agree 
that material support of terrorist activities is the greatest risk, we cannot eliminate the 
possibility of a lone wolf recruit similar to a Richard Reid or Jose Padilla being selected 
for a specific operational mission.  
 
43 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrance K. Kelley, David Brannan, & Keith Crane, Developing 
Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience, Monograph MG-365 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 45; Seth G. Jones, “Afghan Problem is Regional,” United Press 
International, (Washington, D.C., July 4, 2007), at 
http://www.upi.com/Security_Terrorism/Analysis/2007/07/04/outside_view_afghan_problem_is_regional/5
507/ (Accessed July, 25, 2007). 
44 John P. Sullivan, interview by the author, June, 8, 2007; Arthur A. Leonardo, interview by the 
author, June 29, 2007. 
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 A distinction must be made in the case of homegrown terrorists since the cultures, 
socioeconomic conditions, and degree of freedoms are vastly different in Western 
societies than in the Middle East. The cultural differences carry over to the prison 
environment where living conditions in general are better in U.S. institutions. While there 
are cases of notable homegrown terror perpetrators that suffer from mental illness, such 
as Ted Kaczynski, Eric Harris, and Cho Seung-Hui, the narrow focus of this research to 
radicalization within correctional institutions has not produced empirical data that 
associates mental illness with the genesis of terrorist behavior. The case of Washington 
falls into the category of a rational actor that made a conscious choice to take calculated 
risks in pursuit of the group’s desired objectives. No single behavioral theory by itself 
will explain the homegrown terrorist’s motivations and it is more likely that a 
combination of sociological and psychological conditions make an inmate that is 
predisposed to commit violent acts to be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.  
Much of the available literature points to international terrorists being from 
middle class to affluent families, educated, and successful.45 However, the potential pool 
of recruits in the U.S. who meet this description will more often be found at 
undergraduate institutions of higher education rather than from the correctional system. It 
is far more likely that the socioeconomic position of the prison radicalized convert will be 
from a disadvantaged, frustrated, and uneducated demographic. Their experiences with 
the real or perceived injustices of society make them vulnerable to charismatic leaders 
that offer a means to resolve their anger in a meaningful way.46 This is supported by 
Victorff who contends that “identity-starved joiners are also hypothesized to be 
motivated by a desire to embrace the intimate tutelage of a charismatic leader.”47 When 
the charismatic influence is a respected inmate acting as a religious scholar or a radical 
Imam brought in from outside the prison, inmates searching for value and purpose in 
 
45 Angela Gendron, “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment,” Canadian Centre 
for Intelligence and Security Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton 
University Volume 2006-4 (March 2007): 8, at http://www.carleton.ca/cciss/res_docs/itac/gendron_e.pdf 
(Accessed June 11, 2007). 
46 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 86-88. 
47 Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” 23. 
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their lives will be indoctrinated to an extremist ideology that is distorted through 
religion.48 It is this charismatic influence that concerns Cilluffo who noted that Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi was not much more than a street thug before his prison term provided 
him the opportunity to become one of the most charismatic figures in al Qaeda in Iraq.49
Sullivan mentioned the importance of collaboration between the prison 
chaplaincy service and correctional security to provide inmates with access to moderate 
Imams.50 In the UK, prison officials are trying to recruit “homegrown Imams to minister 
to the needs of their Muslim inmates, rather than relying on foreign Imams whom they 
claim are often unfamiliar with the West of beholden with foreign interests.”51 Officials 
in Her Majesty’s Prison Service have appointed a full-time Muslim Advisor to administer 
the Islamic religious services program and since 2001 his efforts have resulted in the 
addition of 23 full-time Muslim chaplains.52 By seeing the same Imams over a period of 
time a rapport can be established that provides a sense of stability as converts learn the 
teachings of Islam. To date, the BOP has still not adequately improved their procedures 
as it relates to recruitment and screening of religious contractors and volunteers. This 
leaves a void for inmates that see themselves as surrogate Imams to seize an opportunity 
for espousing radical messages in the name of religion. 
In the previous chapter Cilluffo suggests that moderate Muslims should be 
involved in supporting the anti-extremist message to counter the radical influence, yet 
employing such a strategy must be done with great care. “Implementing a Muslim prison 
ministry program with western rationality and biases can result in increased number of 
 
48 Hudson, Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism, 43. 
49 Frank J. Cilluffo, interview by the author, July 10, 2007. 
50 Sullivan, interview with the author. 
51 Roy Walmsey, World Prison Population List, Fifth Ed. (London: Research, Development and 
Statistics Directorate, Home Office, 2004), 5, at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r234.pdf 
(Accessed March 12, 2007). 
52 James A. Beckford, “Muslims in the Prisons of Britain and France,” Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies 13, no.3, (2005): 291. 
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terrorists and terrorist supporters.”53 The perception that prison Imams are agents of the 
U.S. government or implementing an impure form of Islam will have just as much of a 
negative effect in countering the radical influence as perpetuating the current void of 
inadequate Islamic religious services.  
According to the FBI, “the situations that place converts in a position to be 
influenced by Islamic extremists appear to be more important than the convert’s initial 
motivations for converting.”54 During the beginning stages of radicalization the inmate is 
introduced to new ideas and people who will influence his conversion through intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivations.55 Inmates who have experienced a lifetime of abuse and 
neglect creating a void in their lives are presented with the extremist group which seeks 
to replace a void with a supportive social network that not only offers protection and 
moral direction within the prison, but external support upon release. In the case of prison 
convert,s it is those interactions and changes in behavior that will lead the trained 
observer to identify inmates that are beginning to build their new extremist identity.  
 It may be more difficult to identify group associations where individuals or 
criminal prison gangs clandestinely provide material support for terrorist operations. In 
some cases the gang hierarchy may be unaware that their criminal enterprise with an 
extremist group is funding terrorism activities and in other cases their need to strengthen 
money-making opportunities outweighs their sense of patriotism. These alliances and 
associations are desirable for “radical Islamist groups because of their ability to operate 
freely in Europe, Asia and North America without arousing the suspicion of security 
authorities.”56  
 In the cases of Washington and Fort we see that their gang involvement led to 
associations with terrorism, but the motivation for the charismatic terrorist leader that 
 
53 James K. Dooghan, “Muslim Prison Ministry: Hindering the Spread of the Radical, Militant, 
Violent and Irreconcilable Wing of Islam,” School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army 
Command and General Staff College,(Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2006), 49, at 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dtic/nps23-01230701.pdf&code=5a1eaf8553d0475bebbed17ee94e713f 
(Accessed July 28, 2007). 
54 U.S. DOJ, FBI Counterterrorism Division, Radicalization Process, 4. FOUO. 
55 Ibid, 5. 
56 Gendron, “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment,” 13. 
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influenced them was material support for future domestic operations in the United States. 
When it comes to 2nd and 3rd generation gangs, Sullivan believes we may start to see 
these gangs and cartels work together for mutual benefits and that may lead to the 
development of shared political philosophies: 
What we are seeing are tactical alliances and alliances of convenience 
where the criminal gang doesn’t embrace the overarching ideology. They 
just do it because they want to make money and this is the most common 
situation. The more dangerous prospect is that the criminal group will buy 
the extreme ideology and graft it onto their own organization. We haven’t 
seen that yet, but that is the potential.57
 For prison radicalization to be recognized as a homeland security threat that 
transcends the corrections discipline there needs to be a fundamental shift in the 
perception that incarceration interrupts a terrorist group’s ability to influence activities 
outside prison walls. One of the common themes throughout the survey and interviews 
focused on the need for better communication between agencies and especially across 
different levels of government. Intra-agency communication appears to be better in full 
service agencies like the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department where officers that 
are assigned to the jail, patrol, and investigations all work for the same agency. Although 
there are still barriers to communication, mid and upper level management that have been 
assigned to several different areas of the agency throughout their careers are better 
prepared to mitigate the barriers through informal relationships built over many years. 
Being able to link jail intelligence with outside intelligence will help us to understand the 
associations by identifying who is visiting radicals and then developing connections 
through conspiracy investigations. 
 One of the recommendations in the Inspector General’s report to the BOP 
proposed closer monitoring of all religious activities within prisons, but only after 
instituting a training program to prepare correctional officers to recognize the signs of 
radicalization.58 In the previous chapter it was also suggested that taking advantage of 
training available in other countries to draw upon their experience and expertise may help 
 
57 Sullivan, interview with the author. 
58 U.S. DOJ, OIG, 49. 
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our domestic intelligence efforts. The importance of training and education cannot be 
overstated, but it is imperative to remember that constitutional protections do not stop at 
prison gates and much of what other countries carry out at the practitioner level is 
untenable in the United States. Training and education must go beyond tactical and 
operational subjects to include legal constraints, cultural norms and mores, and high 
liability issues.  
 In addition to the examples provided by the interviewees in the previous chapter, 
the author has experience with an organized network of multi-agency, multi-discipline 
task forces to address homeland security issues. The State of Florida is divided into seven 
regional domestic security task forces that collect, report and share timely information 
and intelligence to assist public safety leaders in their prevention and preparedness 
efforts. During significant events, resources are distributed to the affected areas to 
support Incident Commanders at all levels and share equipment that would otherwise be 
unavailable to smaller agencies. The Department of Corrections is a member of these 
domestic security task forces and occasionally supports response operations throughout 
the state. The challenge for senior corrections administrators will be to increase the 
department’s participation in information and intelligence sharing activities by 
committing dedicated resources to state fusion centers to coordinate the flow of 



















VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Throughout the surveys and interviews there were recurring themes that can best 
be summarized as a mixture of frustration and need. Many of the responses related stories 
of supervisors and administrators frustrated by people in leadership positions that were 
unwilling to recognize the issue – highlighted in the literature, survey, and through 
interviews with experts – and take action. One particular survey respondent stated that his 
fear is that prisons were becoming fertile recruiting grounds for violent and treacherous 
groups, but the perception is that administration’s response is more concerned with the 
political ramifications of admitting that a problem exists. This concern is echoed by 
several of his colleagues in the survey who commented that external pressures on 
administration prevents any progress being made for fear that negative exposure attached 
to their prison would result in career suicide.  
 The author experienced this first-hand when trying to secure participation in the 
survey and interviews. Some of this can be attributed to an inherent lack of trust in law 
enforcement and corrections cultures, but there was a distinct sense of trepidation in 
nearly every communication about the political ramifications of speaking out on the 
sensitive topic of prison radicalization. Despite multiple emails and telephone calls most 
people in positions of senior leadership did not respond at all and nearly all that did 
respond found reasons not to contribute. The few brave souls that agreed to lend their 
experience and expertise to the research were either not affected by organizational 
politics or felt the threat to our homeland security was significant enough to warrant the 
risks.  
 An important opportunity exists to create dialogue on an emerging threat to our 
national security. This thesis has shown that officials at the federal, state and local levels 
recognize radicalization in prisons as a problem worth exploring to determine the extent 
of the risk and how to develop effective responses to counter the threat. Initiating open 
discussion is the first step toward understanding the threat and it should not result in 
embarrassment, but rather a deeper awareness of the influences in prisons so we can 
increase our prevention and response efforts. 
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 The job of senior leadership officials is not to design the countermeasures for 
prison radicalization, but to acknowledge that the problem exists and initiate change by 
empowering stakeholders to work toward strategic goals and letting them create the 
framework that will ensure success. The research has produced findings that suggest 
initiating transformational change in particular areas may have a greater opportunity for 
success than in others, however leaders must understand that there will be setbacks and 
accept error as part of the growing process.  
As a result of the findings the following recommendations are offered as options 
for corrections to increase preparedness, collaboration, and awareness of the threat: 
• Establish small, networked units within prisons, such as Security Threat 
Intelligence Units (STIU), that will identify and report extremist activity that 
occurs in prisons. These units can act as the information and intelligence 
conduit for extremist and gang information to the regional and state level, 
coordinate intervention activities within individual prisons, and serve as the 
liaison between prisons and agencies that conduct homeland security or 
criminal investigations.  
• Close the gap on information sharing by assigning a senior corrections 
employee to the state fusion center to be the intelligence liaison for the 
Department of Corrections. This recommendation is a win-win proposal as 
corrections will become a full partner in homeland security and be both a 
provider and consumer of intelligence. Law enforcement will add a source of 
valuable information that will result in leads being developed for conspiracy 
investigations and identifying extremists outside of prisons that are exerting 
radical influence in the community. 
• Multiply the value of existing resources by integrating the chaplaincy service 
with STIUs to identify radical influences within organizations that provide 
faith-based services to inmates. Leaders within the chaplaincy service can be 
motivated to seek out moderate Imams within local communities to volunteer 
for prison ministry as a way of fulfilling the zakah or sadaqah. The value 
innovation of this recommendation is incorporating this existing resource in a 
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proactive program to not only be a source of information, but also a counter-
radicalization tool that will provide alternatives to Prislam and extremist 
rhetoric.  
• Recruit volunteers to assist in non-sensitive positions that will free existing 
employees to concentrate on key functions that identify or interrupt 
radicalization activities. Retired employees often become bored after some 
time has passed and long to experience the camaraderie they felt as part of the 
organization. Their expertise can be useful for as little as a few hours to as 
much as a few days per week. This is another win-win proposal. 
• Supplement domestic training classes with exchange programs that immerse 
key corrections personnel with their counterparts in foreign prisons to learn 
how to recognize the signs of radicalization and the countermeasures used to 
prevent it. Many state and local agencies are already doing this on the law 
enforcement side of public safety so corrections can draw upon their 
experiences to establish the right connections to get started. While this is an 
effort that should ideally be initiated at the federal level, state governments 
may be forced to act on their own in order to make progress in this area. 
 
These recommendations make use of the same networked philosophy that gangs 
and terrorist groups use to create the homeland security threat against us. Although the 
recommendations are the product of research and experience, there will still be 
significant organizational barriers that must be addressed to make the efforts successful. 
Some of the barriers will be cultural biases created by perception gaps while others 
involve cognitive or resource hurdles that require thoughtful analysis and innovation to 
be prepared for those that resist transformational change.  
While “transformations should entail fundamental changes that stretch an 
organization,”59 the failure to recognize the internal and external barriers to change will 
cause most initiatives to fail. Change can be especially difficult in government because it 
 
59 Harold L. Sirkin, Perry Keenan & Alan Jackson, “The Hard Side of Change Management,” in The 
Harvard Business Review on Leading Through Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing 
Corporation, 2006), 162. 
 46 
 
challenges tenured members that are devoted to process by taking them out of their 
comfort zone. To get beyond these cognitive hurdles requires tipping point leadership 
with a clear vision and a support network in place that is not only motivated to influence 
change, but capable to see the transformation through to completion. 
It is not logistically or operationally feasible to have a unit of investigators and 
analysts dedicated to prison radicalization in every correctional facility in the country. 
Recognizing that the threat is greatest in large urban areas where extremist activities can 
be masked in the sea of large prison populations, resources should be concentrated in 
medium to large metropolitan areas that are known to have gang problems. These 
facilities should act as regional hubs to provide training and direction for secondary 
prisons that cannot afford to staff STIUs or send personnel to foreign countries for 
training, but still need the skills to recognize the signs of radicalization and how to report 
it. 
It is vitally important that the goals and objectives of implementing these 
recommendations are clear and communicated throughout the respective organizations. 
Multiple goals that encourage bureaucracy and stifle innovation will result in a “one size 
fits all” initiative that will not work in every region. Leaders must acknowledge that what 
works in Los Angeles may not necessarily yield the same results in Chicago or Miami so 
it is important that individual states tailor their own programs to meet their needs. This 
will be especially difficult in large bureaucracies like state and federal government where 
the political climate favors standardization and conformity. To dismiss the political 
hurdles as simply naysayers committed to the status quo is a tactical error that can kill 
any strategic plan. Support from key political allies in corrections, law enforcement, 
homeland security, and the legislature is essential to sustaining the effort. 
There are also legitimate resource hurdles to jump when instituting organizational 
change in bureaucracies and leaders should prepare in advance for challenges from 
individuals or organizations that will resist transformational growth. For example, unions 





                                                
doing for overtime. Tipping point leaders will recognize these hurdles before they 
become an issue and work with key players both in the organization and union to resolve 
any concerns.   
Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research 
 Many authors of the existing research on prison radicalization note that the threat 
is still evolving and that not enough study has been completed to assess the full impact of 
the problem. The need for such studies is particularly evident based on the number of 
documented cases of recent terror plots uncovered or interrupted that have direct 
connections to suspects influenced to a radical ideology while in prison. Further research 
could be conducted to determine what behaviors, if any, are associated with known 
terrorists converted to a radical ideology in prison and what actions they took upon 
release that caused them to continue their cycle of radicalization. 
 The most significant limitation of this research was that participation in the survey 
was limited to a relatively small number of practitioners. There is a distinct possibility 
that a larger number of responses would yield different data, but the reasons for limited 
participation are not likely to change unless the political ramifications of speaking out are 
diminished and people in senior positions of management publicly acknowledge the 
problem. 
 Another deficiency in this research is that the author was not able to interview or 
survey extremists, prison gang members, or terrorists to account for their perceptions and 
opinions. There may be a segment of the homeland security community and academia 
that questions the relevance of such data, but until we understand all of the dynamics that 
influence radicalization we must not allow our own biases to misinterpret the problem. 
Further research should include direct communication with these groups because 
“whatever understanding and sensitivity can be developed by absorbing the 
anthropological literature mentioned above, there is simply no substitute for firsthand 
experience of, and dialogue with, members of the cultural group under consideration.”60
 
60 David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, & N.T. Anders Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards an 
Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 24, no. 1 (January 2001): 16.  
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 Additional research in foreign countries that experience a higher threat for prison 
radicalization will add to the understanding and significance of the problem, plus 
encourage collaboration and communication between the United States and our allies in 
the fight against terrorism. 
It is not the intent of this research to determine the degree of risk of terrorist 
groups to use violence as a tool of influence; rather it assumes that extremists are already 
in the strategic planning phase and seeking means of support to carry out attacks against 
the United States. As we harden our critical infrastructure and limit access to the tools 
that terrorists have used against us in the past, it is logical to assume that the enemy will 
find new capabilities to attack us using what we least expect to keep our defenses off 
balance. Our response is to proactively address vulnerabilities beyond simply hardening 
potential targets and reducing prison radicalization is one way to limit the pool of recruits 
for terrorist operations. The question is will the U.S. take the appropriate action in 
response to the advance warning of the threat to avoid what could be considered the next 













APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Acronyms and Definitions used in this Survey 
 
BOP – Federal Bureau of Prisons 
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation  
JTTF – FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
 
For the purposes of this survey the term “radicalization” is defined by the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons (BOP) as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt 
terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be 
taken for political or religious purposes.” The term “extremist” is defined as inmates with 
radical ideologies who use racial, religious, political, or cultural beliefs to recruit and 
propagate criminal activity internal or external to the prison. Extremist groups may 
include, but are not limited to: prison gangs, right-wing, left-wing, anti-government, 
racist, religious, anarchist, environmental, or animal rights groups. 
 
1. Which of these extremist groups are active in your prison? 
 
Group                                                                           (Yes)                (No) 
Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, etc.) 
Religious (Muslim, Christian, etc.) 
Right-wing (Racists, fascists, Skinheads, KKK, Aryan Nation, etc.) 
Left-wing (ELF, ALF, Weather Underground, etc.) 
Anti-government  
Other (Please specify) 
 
2. The following is a list of possible sources of information and intelligence pertaining to 
extremist activity in prisons. How useful have you found these resources to be? (Mark 
one box for each source) 
 
Source               (Never used)  (Not very useful)  (Somewhat useful)  (Very useful) (Used regularly) 
 
FBI classified reports 
FBI unclassified reports  
Federal BOP reports 
Other federal agency reports 
Your state office of Homeland Security 
Corrections professional associations 
Law enforcement professional associations 
Media (electronic or print) 
Internet 
Books, academic journals, periodicals 




Other (please specify) 
 
3. The FBI is the lead federal law enforcement agency against domestic terrorism and has 
formed JTTFs to maximize interagency cooperation and coordination to address terrorism 
problems in the United States. How often does your agency interact with JTTF 
personnel? (If never skip to question 5) 
 
(Never)  (Occasionally)  (Regularly) 
 
4. Did this interaction relate to extremist activity in prisons? 
 
(Yes)  (No) 
 
5. Does your prison have a dedicated unit, section, group, or individual specifically 
assigned to identify, track, and/or report radicalization or extremist activity? 
 
(Yes)  (No) 
 
6. Which of the following responsibilities depict the duties of this unit, section, group, or 





Analysis and reporting of information/intelligence 
Training other personnel 
Liaison with law enforcement agencies external to the prison 
Other (please specify) 
 
7. Within the past five years, has your prison increased the number of personnel 
specifically assigned to security threat units (STIU) for the purpose of identifying and 
reporting extremist activity? 
 
(Yes)  (No) 
 
8. If you answered yes to question #7, how many personnel are assigned to security threat 
units (STIU)? 
 
Sworn full-time  ______ 
Sworn part-time ______ 
Non-sworn full-time ___ 
















Other (please describe) 
 
11. Is this information shared with law enforcement or corrections officials outside of 
your prison? 
 
(Yes) (No) (Don’t know) 
 






Other (please describe) 
 
13. How do you receive information of extremist activity from other areas of 
responsibility? 
 
14. How do you receive intelligence related to extremist activity from other prisons? 
 






16. Is radicalization or extremist group training covered in your basic certification 
curriculum?  
(Yes)  (No) 
 
17. What type of education and training is available that identifies indicators of 




18. Is the available training adequate to address the problem of radicalization and 
extremist group activity as you see it? 
 
(Yes)  (No) 
 
19. What type of additional education and training would be beneficial? 
 
20. What are the barriers to obtaining more training related to radicalization and extremist 
group activity? (Check all that apply) 
 
Training is not available in my area 
Lack of local funding 
Lack of available federal funding 
Extremist training not high on the priority list 
Other (Please specify) 
 
Respondent Organization Information 
 
21. How many inmates are currently incarcerated in your facility? 
 
22. How many personnel are assigned to your prison? 
 
Sworn   _____ 
Non-sworn  _____ 
 
23. Identify the type of prison with which you are affiliated. 
 
(State)  (Federal)  (Other, please describe) 
 
24. Are you personally assigned to a security threat unit (STIU) or have the responsibility 
of collecting and reporting extremist activity for your prison? 
 
(Yes)  (No) 
 
25. Additional comments: 
 
(Optional) Point of contact information:  Name 
            Title 
            Agency 
       Address 
       City/Town 
       State 
       Zip/Postal Code     
            Telephone 
            E-mail address 
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(Optional) Additional comments not covered in survey questions. 
 
Thank you for participating in this important research. If you have any questions or 
comments related to this survey or my research please feel free to contact me by 
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APPENDIX B: INVITATION E-MAIL 
Dear Corrections/Law Enforcement official, 
 
I am a master’s student at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval 
Postgraduate School conducting research to determine the extent of radicalization 
activities in U.S. prisons. You are invited to participate in this research study to help 
homeland security officials to better understand the current level of preparedness against 
terrorism. Participation in this study is voluntary. The purpose of this survey is to collect 
data from corrections and law enforcement experts to identify gaps in intelligence 
collection and reporting of extremist activity in U.S. prisons.  
 
All surveys are coded to protect the identity of the respondent and their agency. At no 
time will information regarding specific participants or agencies be released to any 
individuals or institutions. While the analysis of the data and relevant comments to 
support the analysis will be published in the thesis, at no time will names or identifying 
information be used or released without prior consent.  
 
The benefit of participating in this study is that you will be helping us to address a serious 
threat to the United States. There is no other compensation for your participation in this 
research. Any questions should be addressed to Captain Mike Coffin at (386) 736-5961, 
x3254 or (386) 547-0828. 
 
Thank you for your contribution to this important research. 
 
Captain Mike Coffin 
Volusia County Sheriff’s Office 
DeLand, Florida 
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Table 1.   Prison population, manpower and type (Q22-24). 
 
  Mean SD Range 
Inmates currently incarcerated 1656 2395 60-14000 
Sworn 283 474 0-3000 Numbers 
employed Non-sworn 189 269 0-1109 
     
  Frequency (%)  
State 34 (69.4)  




*Other 15 (30.6)  
 Total 49 (100.0)  
     
Breakdown by type of prison Mean SD Range 
  State Other State Other State Other 




Sworn  184 501 201 770 0-800 0-3000 Numbers 
employed Non-sworn 197 171 272 270 0-1109 0-1000 
 




Table 2.   Ratings of how useful available resources are as sources of 
information and intelligence pertaining to extremist activity in prisons (Q3).  
Information/intelligence 
source 






Freq 6 7 4 4 28 49 FBI classified reports (%) (12.2) (14.3) (8.2) (8.2) (57.1) (100)
Freq 6 13 3 2 25 49 FBI unclassified reports (%) (12.2) (26.5) (6.1) (4.1) (51.0) (100)
Freq 5 8 9 3 24 49 Federal BOP reports (%) (10.2) (16.3) (18.4) (6.1) (49.0) (100)
Freq 7 9 11 3 19 49 Other federal agency 
reports (%) (14.3) (18.4) (22.4) (6.1) (38.8) (100)
Freq 9 7 14 4 15 49 State office of Homeland 
Security (%) (18.4) (14.3) (28.6) (8.2) (30.6) (100)
Freq 0 8 22 15 4 49 Corrections professional 
associations (%) (0.0) (16.3) (44.9) (30.6) (8.2) (100)
Freq 1 13 17 12 6 49 Law enforcement 
professional associations (%) (2.0) (26.5) (34.7) (24.5) (12.2) (100)
Freq 11 11 18 2 7 49 Media (electronic or print) (%) (22.4) (22.4) (36.7) (4.1) (14.3) (100)
Freq 3 16 15 11 4 49 Internet (%) (6.1) (32.7) (30.6) (22.4) (8.2) (100)
Freq 3 17 23 4 2 49 Books, academic journals, 
periodicals (%) (6.1) (34.7) (46.9) (8.2) (4.1) (100)
Freq 7 9 12 8 13 49 Radical group 
publications (%) (14.3) (18.4) (24.5) (16.3) (26.5) (100)
Freq 3 12 14 13 7 49 Informants (%) (6.1) (24.5) (28.6) (26.5) (14.3) (100)
Freq 12 3 3 0 31 49 *Other (%) (24.5) (6.1) (6.1) (0.0) (63.3) (100)
Bold text: Most frequent response. Blue highlight indicates next most frequent to “Don’t know”. 





Table 3.   Interaction with JTTF (Q4-5). 
 Response Frequency (%)  
Never 24 49.0  
Seldom 20 40.8  





Very frequently 1 2.0  
 Total 49 100.0  
     
Response Frequency (%) (valid %) 
No 8 16.3 61.5 











Table 4.   Relationship between interaction with JTTF and nature of that 
interaction. 
Q4. Interact with JTTF Total 
 Frequency Seldom Frequently or 
very frequently 
 
Observed 8 0 8 
Expected 5.5 2.5 8.0 
 
No 
Std. Residual 1.0 -1.6  
Observed 1 4 5 
Expected 3.5 1.5 5.0 





Std. Residual -1.3 2.0  
Total  Observed 9 4 13 
  Expected 9.0 4.0 13.0 
   
 Value df p-value (2-
sided) 




Table 5.   Internal reporting of extremist activity (Q10-11). 
 Response Frequency (%)  
Never 5 (10.2)  
Seldom 24 (49.0)  
Frequently 17 (34.7)  
How frequently 
extremist activity 
is reported within 
area of 
responsibility 
Very frequently 3 (6.1)  
 Total 49 (100.0)  
 
Response Frequency (%) (valid %) 
Verbally 12 (24.5) (29.3) 
Written report 19 (38.8) (46.3) 






Other 0 (0.0) (0.0) 




Table 6.   Relationship between reporting of extremity activity (Q10) and 
existing policies for facilitating the reporting of extremist activity (Q16). 
10. How frequently do you 
report extremist activity 








Observed 14 1 15 





Std. Residual 1.8 -2.1  
Observed 13 19 32 
Expected 18.4 13.6 32.0 












Std. Residual -1.3 1.5  
Total  Observed 27 20 47 
 Expected 27.0 20.0 47.0 
Chi-square test 
  Value df p-value   
Pearson χ2 11.607 1 .001   
Logistic regression 
      95% CI for Odds ratio
B S.E. Wald df p-value Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Q16 3.018 1.096 7.587 1 .006 20.456 2.388 175.208 




Table 7.   Relationship between reporting of extremity activity (Q10) and 
extremist group/radicalization covered in certification curriculum (Q17). 
10. How frequently do you 
report extremist activity 






Observed 10 1 11 
Expected 6.7 4.3 11.0 Not covered 
Std. Residual 1.3 -1.6  
Observed 14 9 23 
Expected 14.0 9.0 23.0 Somewhat 
Covered 
Std. Residual .0 .0  
Observed 4 6 10 
Expected 6.1 3.9 10.0 Covered
Std. Residual -.8 1.1  
Observed 0 2 2 








curriculum?   
Well Covered
Std. Residual -1.1 1.4  
Total Observed 28 18 46 
Expected 28.0 18.0 46.0 
Chi-square test 
Value df p-value 
Pearson χ2 9.107 3 .028 
Logistic regression 
      95% CI for Odds ratio
B S.E. Wald df p-value Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Q17 1.357 .505 7.224 1 .007 3.885 1.444 10.453 




Table 8.   External reporting of extremist activity (Q12-13). 
 Response Frequency (%)  
Yes 33 (67.3)  
No 5 (10.2)  
Information 
shared with law 
enforcement 
outside prison  
Uncertain 11 (22.4)  
 Total 49 (100.0)  
     
 Response Frequency (%) (valid %) 
Verbally 9 (18.4) (26.5) 
Written report 9 (18.4) (26.5) 
Electronically 7 (14.3) (20.6) 
Intelligence report 6 (12.2) (17.6) 
 
 
How is this 
information 
shared? 
Uncertain 3 (6.1) (8.8) 





Table 9.   Relationship between sharing of information with external law 
enforcement (Q12) and attitudes on adequacy of training (Q19). 
19. Is the available training 
adequate to address the problem of 
radicalization and extremist group 







Observed 5 19 9 33 
Expected 9.4 17.5 6.1 33.0 
 
Yes 
Std. Residual -1.4 .4 1.2  
Observed 5 0 0 5 
Expected 1.4 2.7 .9 5.0 
 
No 
Std. Residual 3.0 -1.6 -1.0  
Observed 4 7 0 11 









Std. Residual .5 .5 -1.4  
Total Observed 14 26 9 49 
Expected 14.0 26.0 9.0 49.0 
Chi-square test 
Value df p-value 





Table 10.   Receiving information and intelligence from other areas of 
responsibility, extracted from open-ended questions (Q14-15). 
 Response category or theme Frequency (%) 
Does not happen/ None 5 (10.2) 
Verbally/ meetings/ phone calls 6 (12.2) 
Written reports/ incident report/ memos 11 (22.4) 
Electronic/ e-mail/ internet 7 (14.3) 
Combination of verbal/written/electronic 10 (20.4) 
STG Supervisor 3 (6.1) 





from other areas 
of responsibility 
received? 
Did not understand question 4 (8.2) 
 Total 49 (100.0) 
   
 Response category or theme Frequency (%) 
Does not happen/None 8 (16.3) 
Verbally/ meetings/ phone calls 3 (6.1) 
Written reports/ incident report/ memos 8 (16.3) 
Electronic/ e-mail/ internet 11 (22.4) 
Combination of verbal/written/electronic 12 (24.5) 
STG Supervisor 4 (8.2) 








Did not understand question 1 (2.0) 
 Total 49 (100.0) 
 
Table 11.   Dedicated STIU and their responsibilities (Q6-9). 
 Response Frequency (%)  
No 12 (24.5)  Prison has 
dedicated STIU 
Yes 37 (75.5)  
 Total 49 (100.0)  
 
*Response Frequency (%) (% of Yes) 
Investigation 30 (61.2) (81.1) 
Intelligence collection 34 (69.4) (91.9) 
Analysis/reporting 26 (53.1) (70.3) 






Liaison 27 (55.1) (73.0) 
Statistics below include responses for only those who answered Yes for dedicated STIU unit 
(n=37) 
 Response Frequency (%)  
No 21 (56.8)  Increased number 
of STIU personnel 
within last 5 years Yes 16 (43.2)  
 
 †Response Frequency (%)  
Did not disclose number 4 (10.8)  
1 to 4 21 (56.8)  
4 to 9 4 (10.8)  
10-19 5 (13.5)  
 
Numbers currently 
assigned to STIUs 
>20 3 (8.1)  
* Multiple response question  







Table 12.   Relationship between existence of dedicated STIU (Q6) and extremist 
group training in certification curriculum (Q17). 
 
6. Dedicated unit, section, 
group, or individual? 
Total 
No Yes 
Observed 6 8 14 
Expected 3.4 10.6 14.0 
 
Not covered 
Std. Residual 1.4 -.8  
Observed 6 29 35 












Std. Residual -.9 .5  
Total Observed 12 37 49 
Expected 12.0 37.0 49.0 
Chi-square test 
Value df p-value 
Pearson χ2 3.576 1 .059 
Logistic regression 
      95% CI for Odds ratio
B S.E. Wald df p-value Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Q17 1.671 .627 7.092 1 .008 5.315 1.554 18.174 




Table 13.   Relationship between existence of dedicated STIU (Q6) and attitudes 
on adequacy of training (Q19). 
6. Dedicated unit, section, 
group, or individual? 
Total 
No Yes  
Observed 6 8 14 
Expected 3.4 10.6 14.0 
 
Not adequate 
Std. Residual 1.4 -.8  
Observed 6 20 26 




Std. Residual -.1 .1  
Observed 0 9 9 
Expected 2.2 6.8 9.0 
 
 









as you see it?  
Adequate 
Std. Residual -1.5 .8  
Total Observed 12 37 49 
Expected 12.0 37.0 49.0 
Chi-square test 
Value df p-value 
Pearson χ2 5.501 2 .064 
Logistic regression 
      95% CI for Odds ratio
B S.E. Wald df p-value Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Q19 1.317 .590 4.976 1 .026 3.732 1.173 11.869 




Table 14.   Rating of activity level of known extremist groups within the prisons 
(Q1). 








Freq 4 22 13 9 48 Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, 
Latin Kings, etc.) (%) (8.2) (44.9) (26.5) (18.4) (98.0)
Freq 9 28 7 4 48 Religious (Muslim, Christian, 
etc.) (%) (18.4) (57.1) (14.3) (8.2) (98.0)
Freq 17 21 7 3 48 Right-wing (Racists, fascists, 
Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.) (%) (34.7) (42.9) (14.3) (6.1) (98.0)
Freq 40 7 0 1 48 Left-wing (ELF, ALF, 
Weather Underground, etc.)] (%) (81.6) (14.3) (0.0) (2.0) (98.0)
Freq 33 12 2 1 48 Anti-government 
(%) (67.3) (24.5) (4.1) (2.0) (98.0)
Freq 43 5 0 0 48 *Other 
(%) (87.8) (10.2) (0.0) (0.0) (98.0)
Bold text: Most frequent response 




Table 15.   Ratings of strength of the connection of the extremist groups’ 
activities to their colleagues outside prison (Q2). 








Freq 8 18 10 13 49 Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, 
Latin Kings, etc.) (%) (16.3) (36.7) (20.4) (26.5) (100)
Freq 15 23 7 4 49 Religious (Muslim, Christian, 
etc.) (%) (30.6) (46.9) (14.3) (8.2) (100)
Freq 23 15 7 4 49 Right-wing (Racists, fascists, 
Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.) (%) (46.9) (30.6) (14.3) (8.2) (100)
Freq 41 5 1 2 49 Left-wing (ELF, ALF, 
Weather Underground, etc.)] (%) (83.7) (10.2) (2.0) (4.1) (100)
Freq 37 8 2 2 49 Anti-government 
(%) (75.5) (16.3) (4.1) (4.1) (100)
Freq 46 1 2 0 49 *Other 
(%) (93.9) (2.0) (4.1) (0.0) (100)
Bold text: Most frequent response 




Table 16.   Correlation among ratings of extremist group activity in prisons (Q1). 









r .458 .181 .163 .250 .097 Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, 
Latin Kings, etc.) p .001 .217 .267 .087 .511 
r  .272 .185 .405 .196 Religious (Muslim, Christian, 
etc.) p  .062 .208 .004 .181 
r   .473 .385 .314 Right-wing (Racists, fascists, 
Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.) p   .001 .007 .030 
r    .567 .384 Left-wing (ELF, ALF, Weather 
Underground, etc.)] p    .000 .007 
r     .455 Anti-government 
p     .001 




Table 17.   Correlation among ratings of extremist group strength of connection 
to colleagues outside prisons (Q2). 









r .576 .461 .236 .414 .112 Prison gangs (Bloods, Crips, 
Latin Kings, etc.) p .000 .001 .102 .003 .445 
r  .423 .465 .553 .039 Religious (Muslim, Christian, 
etc.) p  .002 .001 .000 .791 
r   .240 .410 .262 Right-wing (Racists, fascists, 
Skinheads, KKK, Aryan, etc.) p   .097 .003 .069 
r    .707 .314 Left-wing (ELF, ALF, Weather 
Underground, etc.)] p    .000 .028 
r     .396 Anti-government 
p     .005 




Table 18.   Reporting policies and related training (Q16-17). 
 
 Response Frequency (%)  
Yes 32 (65.3)  
No 15 (30.6)  
Has written 
policies related to 
identifying and 
reporting of 
extremist activity Uncertain 2 (4.1)  
 Total 49 (100.0)  
 
Response Frequency (%)  
Not covered 11 (22.4)  
Somewhat covered 23 (46.9)  
Covered 10 (20.4)  









Uncertain 3 (6.1)  





Table 19.   Attitudes regarding adequacy of training (Q19, 21). 
 
 Response Frequency (%)  
Not adequate 14 (28.6)  





radicalization  Adequate 9 (18.4)  
 Total 49 (100.0)  
     
 *Response Frequency (%)  
Training unavailable in 
area 
17 (34.7)  
Lack of local funding 29 (59.2)  
Lack of federal funding 14 (28.6)  
Barriers to 
obtaining more 




Not high priority 29 (59.2)  





Table 20.   Relationship between available training adequate to address problem 
of radicalization (Q19) and radicalization or extremist group training 
covered in basic certification curriculum (Q17). 
19. Is the available training 
adequate to address the 
problem of radicalization 
and extremist group activity 
as you see it? 
Total 
Not adequate Adequate  
Observed 9 5 14 




Std. Residual 2.5 -1.6  
Observed 5 30 35 
Expected 10.0 25.0 35.0 
17. Is radicalization 
or extremist group 






Std. Residual -1.6 1.0  
Total  Observed 14 35 49 
 Expected 14.0 35.0 49.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df p-value 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.250 1 .000 
Logistic Regression 
 95% CI for Odds ratio
B S.E. Wald df p-value Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Q17 2.380 .738 10.400 1 .001 10.800 2.543 45.866 




Table 21.   Education and training available and needed. Extracted from open-
ended questions (Q18, 20). 
 Response category or theme Frequency (%) 
None/ Don't know/ Unsure 12 (24.5) 
Gang identification/ awareness training 8 (16.3) 
STG training 7 (14.3) 
Seminars/ annual meetings 3 (6.1) 
Basic/ in-service training 12 (24.5) 
Intelligence training/ classes 3 (6.1) 








activity? Response not relevant/ understood 4 (8.2) 
 Total 49 (100.0) 
    
 Response category or theme Frequency (%) 
None/ Don't know/ Unsure 10 (20.4) 
Current events/ trends awareness 10 (20.4) 
Specific radicalization training/ awareness 8 (16.3) 
Info sharing/ inter-agency communication 7 (14.3) 
Intelligence gathering & analysis 4 (8.2) 
General education/ Classroom training 7 (14.3) 
 
What type of 
additional 
education and 
training would be 
beneficial? 
Response not relevant/ understood 3 (6.1) 
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